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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, John J. Sweeney, will be referred to in this
Brief as "Sweeney"; the Respondent, Happy Valley, Inc.,
will be referred to as "Happy Valley". This is an action
for an accounting, for a declaration of contractual rights
and for injunctive relief, all of which were demanded of
Happy Valley by Sweeney in the portion of his Complaint
Which went to trial, Count 1, second cause of action of the
Second Amended Complaint. The contest between the parties arises out of a Contract dated August 8, 1957.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
Upon trial before the Court, without jury, in December
1963, District Judge Faux entered Findings, Conclusions,
and a Decree directing Happy Valley to render an accoun~
ing to Sweeney of gross proceeds received by Happy Valley
in the sale of certain real properties, declaring Sweeney's
rights in the 1957 Contract, and denying his claim for an
injunction against Happy Valley (R. 211-221). In accord·
ance with the Decree, Happy Valley has completed its ac·
countings of gross proceeds of sales and has tendered t-0
Sweeney the representative amounts due him thereunder
(R. 223-229).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
By this Appeal, Sweeney apparently seeks a new trial
by jury so that a jury may interpret the 1957 Contract and
determine a proper accounting by Happy Valley thereon.
Sweeney also asks of this Court a determination that
the trial Court erred in its Findings that the Contract of
the parties required an accounting by Happy Valley of
"gross proceeds" as distinguished from "market value" of
real property sales made. He further seeks herein a de
novo review of issues of fact and law in the matter.
It is the position of Happy Valley that the lower
Court's determination of fact and law should be, in all re·
spects, affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The original Complaint of Sweeney, filed in August
of 1962, demanded from Happy Valley and Owen W
Bunker, C. Taylor Burton, and G. Kirk Graff, an account·

s
ing under the 1957 Contract, judgment against each of the
named-defendants for the amounts which the accounting
reflected, and a declaratory judgment of Sweeney's future
rights under the Contract (R. 1-3). After Answer and
discovery, Sweeney was permitted to file an Amended
Complaint (R. 38-62) wherein it was demanded that the
same defendants be required to render an accounting, judgment, that said defendants be enjoined from making future real property sales at prices less favorable than average on the general market, that the individual defendants
be restrained from causing Happy Valley to further breach
its contract with Sweeney, and for declaratory judgment of
Sweeney's future rights under the Contract.
After answer to that Compfaint was filed, (R. 17780), Sweeney, by new counsel, filed a Second Amended
Complaint (R. 121-167) in May 1963, against the same defendants, setting forth four Causes of Action, the Second
Cause containing two counts. Pursuant to Motions of the
defendants at the Law and Motion and Pre-trial Divisions
of the lower Court, the Second Amended Complaint was
dismissed as to the individual defendants with prejudice,
and the same was also dismissed with prejudice with respect to Happy Valley with the exception of Count 1,
Second Cause (R. 175-6, 194-201). Sweeney does not allege
in this appeal, error of the lower Court in the dismissal of
his other claims as against Burton, Bunker, Graff and
Happy Valley.
Under Sweeney's remaining Count 1 of the Second
Cause, it was demanded:
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(a) That "Happy Valley render a true and proper I
accounting" of all sales under the 1957 Contract· i
(R. 134) •
Ii
(b) That "judgment be entered against Happy!
Valley for the amount shown by such accounting":
(R. 134-5).
I
(c) That Happy Valley be enjoined from makin"
further sales at prices less favorable than that avair I
able in the general market; (R. 134).
( d) For an order declaring Sweeney's future
1
rights under the Contract;

I
I

The Pre-trial Order of September, 1963, defined the tri· 1I
able issues as :
I

"* * * an action for an accounting, for de·
clarative relief as to the rights of the Plaintiff and
for injunctive relief, all of which arises out of the
* * * 1957 Agreement" (R. 195).

I

Happy Valley cannot agree vvith the presentation of
facts underlying Count 1, as set forth in the Sweeney Brief.
That Statement, some 14 pages in length, contains erron·
eous and misleading citations of fact, and is so intermingled
with conclusions, innuendos and argument that it neither
defines accurately the issues raised by the pleadings and
developed at pre-trial conference nor reflects the record
of facts presented to the trial Court. Accordingly, Happy
Valley, pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P., submits the
following Statement of Facts in the matter :
On August 8, 1957, Happy Valley (as Firs!
Party), and others, including Sweeney, a partnership,
a corporation, and individuals (as Second Party), en· 1
tered into a written contract concerning the develop· .
l.

I

I
I

5
ment of some 366 acres of land in the vicinity of Willow Creek Country Club as now located at 8300 South
and 2700 East, Salt Lake County (R. 237-241a).
Sweeney has never been a stockholder, officer or director of Happy Valley, and has never made a monetary contribution to or investment in Happy Valley, or
its acquisitions (R. 1117). His repreS'entative shares
in Second Party under the 1957 Contract was 31.8 per
cent (R. 237).
2. The Contract provided, inter alia, that Happy
Valley would purchase under contract from third parties the selected acreage and thereafter sell a portion
to Willow Creek Country Club, a corporation to be
organized by the interests in Second Party. It was
further covenanted that the balance of the acreage,
some 200 acres, would be developed and sold for residential purposes and, after deducting a prescribed adjustment factor, Second Party was to receive 25 percent of the gross proceeds of such sales and Happy
Valley was to receive 75 percent of such gross proceeds (R. 239-240).
3. Under Paragraph 8 of the Contract, Sweeney's
31.8 percent of Second Party entitled him to 7.95 percent (not 7.75 percent as erroneously asserted on page
4 of his Brief) of the gross proceeds of property sales
(R. 241-254). Sweeney is, and has been since January
of 1962, the sole survivor of the Second Party under
the Contract, Happy Valley having acquired all other
interests in Second Party (R. 212).
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4. Owen W. Bunker, C. Taylor Burton and KlrR
Graff were the original directors and stockholders of
Happy Valley. Graff withdrew in both capacities in
1961 (R. 321, 506).
5. Subdivision planning and promotional sales
activity were commenced by Happy Valley in 1957, but
due to unforeseen difficulties with County planning
agencies, subdivision plats were not completed, ap.
proved and recorded until November, 1959 (R. 360·
367, 1131-37).

6. It was proposed under the 1957 Contract that I
costs of acquiring the 366 acres as well as subdivision ,
I
and development expenses of the residential properties
were to be substantially financed through proceeds
from property sales within the development (R. 367).
7. A series of unforeseen events in 1959and196~
placed demands, unanticipated by the Contract, upon
Happy Valley for land payments and residential subdivision costs (R. 366-70, 522-35). Those facts were:

(a) Sweeney, acting for Second Party, notified
Happy Valley that Willow Creek Country Club re· I
quired fee title to the property underlying the goU
course facilities. This was not envisioned by the
1957 Contract (R. 534, 1145).
f

(b) The market for the developed residential lo~
was completely inactive and expected sales did not
materialize (R. 521, 1133-1140).
(c) In addition to cash demands for street, sewer
and other off-site improvements in the developed.
subdivisions, extra improvements were required 01

7
Happy Valley to serve the Country Club (R. 11311133).
( d) Contract payments were, during this time,
due from Happy Valley to original landowners and
some of those had to be renegotiated because of the
title needs of Willow Creek Country Club (R. 1145).
8. To meet these unexpected financial obligations, Bunker, Burton and Graff in their individual
capacities, made cash contributions to Happy Valley,
but for which Happy Valley would not have met its
accounts and obligations (R. 522, 528). In consideration of such cash advancements, Happy Valley, in November, 1959, and May, 1961, sold and conveyed to
Bunker, Burton and Graff a total of 96 improved lots.
The stated, agreed and accepted gross proceeds received by Happy Valley for said conveyances were
$3,000.00 per lot. In determining the price to be paid
Happy Valley by Bunker, Burton and Graff for each
lot, the following was done by Happy Valley:
(a) Real estate opinions were solicited by Happy
Valley and received from land developers and builders (Manford Shaw and Holmes and Jenson), a
banker (William A. Myrick), and real estate appraisers (Edward M. Ashton and Don Stahle) (Ex.
8D-13D).
(b) Individual lots were offered for sale on the
open market between 1959 and 1962 at prices higher
than $3,000.00. No sales were made. Although
Happy Valley accepted deposits from four prospective lot buyers in 1958, on'ly one ripened into a bona
fide sale and option prices on the other three were
refunded because of subdivision changes (R. 37786, 529, 1140).
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( c) Discounts in lot prices were offered to chaiier
members of Willovv Creek Country Club, the discount price being above $3,000.00. Sales could not ,
be made (Ex. 22).
.
1

( d) Sweeney did not want to buy any lots at
$3,000.00 and did not offer to buy after they wer1
plotted and available for sale (R. 1083, 1089-9~,
1141).
9. In September of 1962, Happy Valley sold ana
conveyed four additional improved lots each to Burton
and Bunker, the stated, agreed and accepted gross proceeds received by Happy Valley for such conveyance;

1

being $3,000.00 per lot. As in 1959 and 1961, Burton j
and Bunker were, at the time of said conveyancei,
directors of Happy Valley.
10.

In addition to the conveyances referred tn

above, Happy Valley sold and conveyed other proper· i
ties involved in the accounting:

I

I

(a) In January, 1962, Happy Valley sold and
conveyed to 25 Associates, Inc., and R. E. McCon· I
aughy (each of whom held an interest in Secona
Party) some 31 acres for residential purposes, the
gross proceeds received by Happy _Val~ey therefo;
being the transfer of the respective mterests o,
the grantees as part of Second Party in the 19iii
Contract. Said interest constituted 50.9 percent
of Second Party and had a reasonable cash value

I

of $42,908.00 (R. 1152-3).

j

(b) In May 1962, Happy Valley sold and c~n·
veyed to Estates, Inc., some 2.5 acres of land for

1

I
I

residential purposes necessary to the completion
of Willow Creek Subdivision No. 4 developed by
Manford A. Shaw, which adjoined the Happy Valley property on the south. The stated and accepted gross proceeds received by Happy Valley
for this conveyance was the cost of completion
by Shaw of off-site improvements, street, curb
and gutter, adjacent to Lots owned by Happy Valley in said subdivision, or $13,742.85 (R. 1161,
1172).
(c) In April 1959, Happy Valley conveyed a parcel 100 feet by 130 feet to Salt Lake Water Conservancy District as a well site and location for a
pump house (said conveyance being made with
the knowledge and acquiescence of Sweeney for
the Second Party), as part of a program to provide water for Willow Creek Country Club (R.
418-19). In April 1961, Happy Valley conveyed
to Jessup a triangular shaped parcel (less than
an acre) for the purpose of straightening an irregular boundary. Happy Valley received no proceeds from either the Conservancy District or
Jessup conveyances (R. 1156, 392, 418).
(d) From 1961through1963, Happy Valley sold
certain lots in Willow Creek Subdivision 1, 2, 3
and 4 to third parties on deferred payment contracts and otherwise. These transactions and the
gross proceeds therefrom are not a matter of contest in the case.
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11. When lot sales did not develop as contem.
plated under the 1957 Contract, negotiations ensued
between Happy Valley and Second Party with respect
to the satisfaction and retirement of the latter's 25
percent interest in gross proceeds (R. 1147-1155). By
January 1962, Happy Valley had acquired all outstanding interests of Second Party except for that of
Sweeney, 7.95 percent (R. 421-22, 602-4). Prior to
trial, Happy Valley tendered various accountings to
Sweeney of the gross proceeds received from sales and
conveyances of lots referred to in Paragraphs 8, 9 and
10 ( d) of this Statement. During trial, Happy Valley
tendered an accounting to Sweeney of the gross pro·
ceeds received from the transactions set forth in Para·
graphs lO(a) and (b) (R. 1152-3, 1162). Since Happy
Valley received no proceeds from the conveyances re·
f erred to in Paragraph 10 ( c) above, no accounting as
to those transactions was or has been made.

The trial Court, in review of the Complaint, the Pre-trial
Order and opening statement of counsel, determined the
issues as requiring a legal interpretation of the 1957 Con·
tract and an equitable accounting and proceeded to try the
matter without jury. After some ten days of trial and a
view of the premises, the Court filed a Memorandum Decision ( R. 206-9) and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and a Decree (R. 211-21) in which it:
(a) Determined that Happy Valley and Sweeney
were separate contracting parties and rejected
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Sweeney's contention that Happy Valley was a fiduciary to Sweeney ( R. 206) .
(b) Determined that the action was one for an
accounting, for a declaration as to future rights under
the 1957 Contract, and injunctive relief (R. 206).
(c) Determined that the 1957 Contract required
an accounting by Happy Valley to Sweeney of gross
proceeds of sales and rejected Sweeney's theory that
Happy Valley must account on the basis of "fair market value" (retrospectively determined) of the properties sold ( R. 207) .
( d) Determined that the gross proceeds test was
binding on the parties under the 1957 Contract unless
it was shown that Happy Valley, in making conveyances to the Directors, Bunker, Burton and Graff, was
guilty of dishonest, unfair, unconscionable or overreaching conduct. In such event, an accounting would
be required of Happy Valley on an equitable basis (R.
207).
( e) Determined that market value of the properties at the date of conveyance was relevant as one of
the factors bearing upon the good faith of Happy Valley in the transactions between it and its Directors (R.
208).
(f) Determined that Sweeney carried the burden
of proof in showing that Happy Valley was not in good
faith or that its conduct was unconscionable and dishonest in the lot sales to the Directors (R. 349, 207,
216).
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(g) Found the issues of good faith in favor of
Happy Valley and against Sweeney in connection witli .
I
the lot sales from the Corporation to Bunker, Burtoa I
and Graff (R. 215-16).
(h) Found that Sweeney's expert witnesses on
market value had been given "more than necessary in·
struction" by Sweeney, himself, "in the hope that they
would reproduce his views" (R. 208).
Determined that the testimony of Happy
Valley's witness, William A. Myrick, carried weight
as a practical expression of whether Happy Valley's
conduct was reasonable and in good faith in the con·
veyances to the Directors (R. 208).

I

(i)

I:.

(j) Determined that the testimony of Happy
Valley's witness, C. Francis Solomon, Jr., (to the effect
that the Happy Valley project had been promoted
four or five years sooner than the market warranted) i
was of substantial weight (R. 209).

I

(k) Required Happy Valley to promptly account
and pay to Sweeney 7.95 percent of the gross proceeds
of the contested sales (R. 209).

Determined that the 1957 Contract imposes I
no obligations on Happy Valley to develop the prem·
ises on a time schedule and rejected Sweeney's con·
tention that he was entitled to a veto over future sales
by Happy Valley (R. 218).
(m) Refused to enjoin Happy Valley froni
otherwise selling property in the normal course of
(1)

business (R. 218).
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(n) Determined that each party should pay his
own costs in the matter (R. 221).
Thereafter, HaPPY Valley tendered an accounting along
with a money deposit with the Clerk of the Court (R. 223).
Sweeney's Motion to Amend Findings, Conclusions, Decree
and, in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 230-4) was denied by the trial Court (R. 242).
From the Decree entered, Sweeney takes this Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UNDER THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE
SWEENEY COMPLAINT, THE PRE-TRIAL
ORDER, AND THE TESTIMONY, THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING
THAT SWEENEY WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
A JURY TRIAL.
(1)

The case is involved solely with matters of
accounting and equitable relief under the
1957 Contract.

In Point I (A) of his Brief, Sweeney claims that the
trial Court was in error in denying him a jury trial on the
issues raised by the pleadings and the Pre-trial Order. His
Brief is less than clear, however, in specifying the particula1· issues as to which a jury trial is, as a matter of right,
required. The remains of his Second Amended Complaint
at the trial stage demanded :

14
(1)

"That Happy Valley be ordered to render a
true and proper accounting, including all •
sales, * * * as required by said agree- ,
ment.

(2)

"That judgment be entered against Happy
Valley * * * for the amount shown by
such accounting * * *

(3)

"That the Court enter an order enjoining and
restraining Happy Valley from conveying
lands * * * subject to the agreement

* * *

(4)

"That the Court enter an order enjoining and
restraining Happy Valley from neglecting or
refusing to carry out its obligations under the
agreement.

(5)

"That judgment be entered declaring Plain·
tiff's rights under the agreement, including his
right to regular and complete accountings, his
right to share in gross proceeds from future
sales of lands * * *" (R. 134).

Thus, it is a fair conclusion that Sweeney's Complaint
alone, fixed the case as equitable in nature, and for which
right of trial by jury does not exist. Norback v. Board of
Directors of Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P.
2d 339 (1934). The related questions of law, involving the
interpretation of the 1957 Contract as to whether Sweeney
was entitled to an accounting on "gross proceeds of sales"
or "market value of the properties" or some other standard,
as well as the issue of the good faith of Happy Valley in
the sales to the Directors, were legal and factual issues
appendent and ancillary to the accounting and injunctive
actions. That the nub of the suit was for an accounting and

l
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injunction, both equitable, is witnessed not only by Sweeney's Complaint, but also by the Pre-trial Order:
"The Second Cause of Action is an action for
an accounting, for declaratory relief as to the rights
of the Plaintiff and for injunctive relief, all of
which arises out of the * * * 1957 Agreement" (R. 195).
Such was the posture of the case, an accounting and
injunction action, at the time of trial.
(2)

Breach of Contract by Happy Valley was
not before the Court.

Sweeney claims on appeal that the trial Court was
"confused" as to the nature of the action because, it is
argued, the gravamen of Count 1 of the Second Cause was
Happy Valley's breach of the 1957 Contract (App. Br., pp.
18, 22, 23, 29). Sweeney thus contends that since an action
for breach of contract is one at law and not equity, the
right of trial by jury was reserved in the suit (App. Br.,
p. 23) . The difficulty with Sweeney's argument, of course,
is that the pleadings, the Pre-trial Order, the issues framed,
and the Record all belie a breach of contract theory.
To begin with, not one count of Sweeney's Complaint,
Amended Complaint, or Second Amended Complaint remotely suggests or raises an ex contractu claim; nor does
the prayer in any of the Complaints demand the payment
of damages for breach of contract. Secondly, counsel for
Plaintiff at the pre-trial conference did not propose as an
issue Happy Valley's breach of the 1957 Contract, and the
Pre-trial Order did not so much as insinuate that the re-
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maining Count 1 of the Second Cause involved the breach '
of contract. The trial Court was genuinely concerned with
Sweeney's claim that the action was for breach of contract, •.
even though such claim was not made until the first day '
of trial ( R. 260) . Of particular concern was the fact th;t I
although counsel for Sweeney then argued a breach of
contract, he did not seek to recover damages occasioned by !
the breach. This caveat was not answered by Sweeney
when queried by the Court. Hence, the trial Court drew
the triable issue as:
1

"THE COURT: I fail to see, in your prayer,
in the pleadings - in your prayer - a contention
that this is a breach of contract, and, certainly,
Judge Hansen, in his pre-trial order, Page 2, 'The
Second Cause of Action is an action for - ' (read·
ing)
"I am going to proceed as though this were an ac·
tion in equity for an accounting between the par·
ties" (R. 267).

*

*

*

*

*

*

"Now, with respect to the basis or claim - the
standard which I must use in determining
whether or not plaintiff is entitled to relief on the
basis of the pleadings and the pre-trial conference,
I have rejected that this is an action of breach of
contract.
"I take the view that plaintiff comes here ap·
pealing to equity. It is clear that, if there is fraud,
deceit or over-reaching in what the seller has done
so th~t a reasonable person would be shocked at the
nature of their transaction, that equity will intei~
vene and require the defendant to make a fair an
reasonable accounting of the sales made.

'

I

I

t
...._
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"Accordingly, it appears to me that, if plaintiff shows fraud, deceit, overreaching - possibly,
unreasonable standards - in the sales that have
been made, equity will require the seller to re-make
the accountings on a reasonable basis; that one of
the things that will be helpful to the court in determining whether, under all the circumstances, the
transactions were unreasonable to the point that
equity will intervene, is fair market value" (R.
348).
The Pre-trial and trial Court's determination that the
case was one for an accounting and injunction and not
breach of contract was borne out by the testimony of
Sweeney at the trial. The totality of that evidence was directed to the question of whether Happy Valley had engaged in unconscionable, inequitable, or fraudulent conduct
in the lot conveyances to its Directors, so as to require an
accounting upon a basis other than gross proceeds received
from sales. It is worthy to note that although Finding of
Fact No. 2 of the lower Court affirms that the suit was
for an accounting, declaratory relief and injunctive relief
(R. 212), Sweeney, in his Motion to Amend the Findings,
registered no objection to it on that basis (R. 230).
It is safe to say, therefore, from a survey of the case
in its entirety, that the suit involved an accounting under
the 1957 Contract and declaratory and injunctive relief,
and did not encompass an action for breach of contract.
Ergo, Sweeney has no standing now to claim denial of
iury trial on the theory that such contract issue was before
the trial Court.
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(3)

Under the issues thus defined, trial by jury
was discretionary with the trial Court and
not a matter of right.

Simply drawn, the question to be put is whether an
action for an accounting is of an equitable or legal nature.
If it lies within equitable cognizance, a trial by jury is not
required. Holland v. Wilson, 8 U. 2d 11, 327 P. 2d 250
(1958); Norback v. Bd. of Directors of Church Ext. So·
ciety, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339 (1934). Sweeney, on pages
19 and 20 of his Brief, argues that the suit is a legal rather ,
than an equitable accounting. In so doing, he ignores the
hard core of decisions from this Court which, without exception, has treated actions for an accounting as equitable.
Kimball v. McCormack, 70 Utah 189, 259 Pac. 331 (1926);
Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926). The
most recent holding in this regard is West v. West, 16 U. !
2d 411, 403 P. 2d 22 (1965) wherein this Court stated:
"Inasmuch as this is a suit over an accounting
in a partnership, it is a suit in equity and it is the
responsibility of this Court to review questions of
both law and fact."
Sweeney argues further that because Count 1 demanded
judgment for "the amount shown by such accounting" and
because 78-21-1, U. C. A. 1953, accords a jury trial in a
suit "for money claimed due upon contract," that the case
is at law and not equity. The four corners of Sweeney's
claim were squarely before this Court and rejected in Lane
v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926) wherein the
prayer for relief was :

19
"That Dastrup be required to account to Plaintiff for all moneys received by him under the aforesaid contract for the sale of said property, and that
the Plaintiff have a decree against said Dastrup
for any such sum as may upon an accounting be
found due and payable to him."
This Court through Gideon, C. J., determined the facts in
Lane to present a case in equity:

"This is an equitable action, and this Court is
therefore required to examine the evidence to determine whether the facts found are contrary to
the weight of the evidence, keeping always in mind
that a finding of a trial court upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed unless it is made to appear that the Court has misapplied proven facts or
made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence."
See also Blake v. Amreihen, 36 N. E. 2d 797 (Ohio
1941), wherein it was said:
"The fact that this accounting may result in a
money judgment against him does not change the
action from equity to law entitling him to a jury
trial."
The fact that Sweeney's suit is founded upon the 1957
Contract is no panacea to his present claim of riglht to jury
trial, nor does it invoke the provisions of 78-21-1, U. C. A.
1953. Such does not rob the suit of its equitable nature.
What his argument fails to appreciate is that in practically
every instance, an action for an accounting is grounded
upon a contractual relationship between the parties. If the
contractual relation were to automatically activate the con-
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ditions of 78:-21-1 so as to strip the suit of its equitable
character, the concept of an equitable accounting would be
gone. Once it is determined that equity jurisdiction a\.
taches, the trial Court may also hear and resolve ancillary
and subordinate questions of law within the equitable
framework. The leading case of N orback v. Ed. of Direc·
tors of Church Ext. Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339
( 1934), requires nothing less:
"If the issues are equitable or the major issues
to be resolved by an application of equity, the legal
issues being merely subsidiary, the action should be
regarded as equitable and the rules of equity apply."

The pleadings, pre-trial Order and evidence of trial
are all witness to the fact that Sweeney, under Count 1,
demanded an accounting pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the
1957 Contract. Stated in yet another fashion, Sweeney has
asked for specific performance of that contractual provision.
It is not open to argument in this State that a suit for
specific performance is, by definition, equitable and not
legal. Close v. Blumenthal, 11 U. 2d 51, 354 P. 2d 856
(1960). Accordingly, the trial Court was correct in ruling
that Sweeney did not have a right to trial by jury in the
case.
( 4)

Complexity of the suit, alone, is sufficient to
justify equitable rather than legal cognizance.

The accounting action of Sweeney made necessary the
inquiry, testimony, and evidence with respect to better than
. Y.11·
105 separate real estate fransactions between H appy '
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Jey,. its Directors, and others. Each sale and the gross proceeds received therefrom was a separate transaction, having taken place on different dates and representative of
varying marketing conditions. Examination of evaluation
witnesses on market value (as the latter related to the
issue of good faith) was of necessity, lengthy. In such
eases, the judicial process is served by the efficiency of a
non-jury trial and the authority is substantial that the
multiplicity of factual issues is, by itself, a basis for equity
jurisdiction. Thus, in Jackson v. Gardner, 197 Wash. 276,
84 P. 2d 992 (1938), the Supreme Court of Washington
stated:
"Manifestly the right of the parties could not
be determined except by taking an accounting between them, and, as the transactions appeared by
the pleadings extensive and varied, it necessarily
involved a long and complicated accounting. It has
long been the rule that these conditions alone justified the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of
equity."
The Washington Court continued :
"Jurisdiction of equity in this class of cases
had its rise in the inadequacy of the common-law
remedy. A court of law sitting with a jury is not
a tribunal constituted so as to try an action involving a long account and reach an accurate result.
The jury has no adequate facilities for keeping records of the several items going to make up the account, and the ordinary mind cannot keep them in
memory. The result must necessarily be a verdict
without adequate consideration of the matters involved, resulting, oftener than otherwise, in rank
injustice to one party or the other.
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"We are satisfied that the court did not abuse
its discretion in treating the case as one of equitable
cognizance, triable without a jury."
To the same effect is Sunset Pacifi;c Oil Company v.
Clark, 171Wash.165, 17 P. 2d 879 (1933). If for no other
reason than the complexity of facts, the trial Court in this
case was justified in trying the matter before the equity
side of the Court.
(5)

Authorities relied upon by Sweeney do not
support a right to jury trial in this case.

Some attention, but small, should be given to the citation of cases claimed in support of Sweeney's right to jury
trial under Point I (A) of his Brief.
It is said that the decision of this Court in Halloran·
Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342 (1927)
is to the effect that an accounting is a proceeding at law.
A review of that case does not permit such a finding. In
point of fact, this Court in Heath recognized the accounting
aotion to constitute "an equi1Jable proceeding" but went on
to say that since there existed a lack of mutuality of obligation, equitable relief could not be granted. So far as the
character of the action was concerned, however, Heath is
clearly in line with the equity doctrine of West v. West, 16
U. 2d 411, 403 P. 2d 22 (1965) and Lane v. Peterson, 68
Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374 (1926).
Sweeney also claims that Rule 38, U.R.C.P., guarantees his right to trial by jury in this suit. The swift answer to that argument is that Rule 38 does not grant or
create any right whatsoever to a jury trial. Professor
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Degnan, in his review of the Utah Law on the right to trial
by jury, records the accurate view of the Rule:
"It must be observed that the rule (Rule 38)
seems carefully non-commital. It does not attempt
to define the right which is to be preserved. It
seems to go no further than to say that the right
declared, if any, should be preserved." Degnan,
Right to Jury Trial in Utah, 8 Utah Law Review
109 (1962).

Nor is the case of Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119
Utah 204, 225 P. 2d 739 (1950), cited in Sweeney's Brief,
appropriately considered. That is so because the Complaint
in Fairbanks sought recovery of damages for breach of
contract, an element which divorces it as precedent in this
Appeal.
Finally, the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Dafry Queen V. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 8 L. Ed. 2d
44 (1962) is quoted extensively by Sweeney in an attempt
to buttress his jury trial argument. While the rationale of
that case may possess some abstract interest to the reader,
it is of no precedent in any way binding upon this Court.
It was established at an early date that the guarantees of
the 7th Amendment to the United States Constitution discussed in the Dairy Queen decision, do not apply to the
courts of the several states. Walker v. Sauvi"nette, 92 U. S.
90 (1875). Moreover, the right to trial by jury under the
7th Amendment is not applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Snyder v.
Mass., 291 U. S. 97 (1934). So far as the federal constitutional law is concerned therefor, the sovereign states have
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no obligation to follow the notions as to jur
in the Dairy Queen case. Utah has establish
stitutional precedent in that regard, West
Lane v. Peterson, supra, Kirnball v. McC
which does not fit with the Dairy Queen De
accounting is a proceeding at law requiri
Then too, the simplicity of facts in the Da
sets it apart from the detailed issues befon
in the case at bar. It is a fair presumptiOI
Supreme Court would have taken a differ
jury trial question had the facts therein b
those now before this Court.

On every front, Sweeney was not entit
a trial by jury on the accounting, declarat<
tive issues before the trial Court.
POINT II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRE<
DETERMINATION THAT THE Bl
PROVING THE LACK OF GOOD
THE CONVEYANCES FROM HAPP'
TO ITS DIRECTORS WAS WITH E
(1)

The burden of proof to show goo(
with Happy Valley only if there
iary relationship between it and

Under Point I(B) of his Brief, Sween
claim that Happy Valley (or its Director:
party-defendants) should have carried the
at the trial to show that the conveyances f
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ation to its Directors, Bunker, Burton, and Graff, were not
in bad faith, unconscionable, unfair or fraudulent. Such
claim it is argued, is founded on the principle that directors
owe a fiduciary duty to prove the fairness of their personal
transactions with the corporation. The authorities cited by
Sweeney verify, as a general proposition of law, that directors, as trustees, owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation
and its stockholders and by virtue thereof, have the responsibility of proving the fairness and adequacy of their
individual bargains with the corporation. Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231
(1931) ;Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 117 Utah 530, 218
P. 2d 274 (1950); 3 Fletcher on Corporations, §949 (Perm.
Ed.); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 84 L. Ed. 281 (1939).
While that legal precept is sound in principle, it is clearly
inapplicable and irrelevant under the facts of the instant
case.
The fiduciary relation of which the cases speak is that
of the directors of the corporation as trustees on the one
hand, and the corporation or its stockholders as the cestui
que trust on the other. Thus, in Pepper V. Litton, 308 U.
S. 295, 84 L. Ed. 281 (1939), relied upon by Sweeney, the
action was brought by the Trustee in Bankruptcy, as the
representative of the corporation, against the directors of
the bankrupt company. A fiduciary association between
the corporate directors and the trustee was found to attach.
In Hansen v. Granite Holding Co., 117 Utah 530, 218 P. 2d
27 4 ( l 950) , a derivative action was instituted by stockholders in behalf of a corporation against corporate offi-
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cers. Upon concluding that "a fiduciary relation exists between the Board of Directors and the stockholders'', this
Court held that the directors had the burden of proof as
to the fairness of their dealings with the corporaition.
Again, in Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining
Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231 (1931), also relied upon in
Sweeney's Brief, the corporation, itself, questioned the propriety of the transactions of certain corporate officers. In
passing upon the question of burden of proof, this Court
said:

"The authorities everywhere recognize the rule
that, where a fiduciary relation is shown to exist,
the burden is upon the fiduciary to show good faith
and fair dealing in his relations with his cestui que
trust." ( Emphasis added.)
1

In each of the cases cited by Sweeney, therefore, the
suit was between the corporation (or its representative,
such as a trustee in bankruptcy or a derivative stock·
holder) on the one hand, and directors or officers of the
corporation on the other. There is nothing magic about th(
assignment of the burden of proof to the directors in sud
cases to show good faith, it being merely a normal exten
sion of the principle that where the fiduciary relationshiJ
exists, the burden in evidencing tJhe adequacy of the trans
action is upon the fiduciary. Perry v. McConkie, 1 U. 2(
189, 264 P. 2d 852 (1953).
The burden of proof issue in the case at bar may no'
be quickly framed: Does there exist a fiduciary relation
ship between Happy Valley and Sweeney so as to pJac
upon the Corporation the burden to prove the good f ai't
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of the corporate sales and conveyances to the Directors,
Bunker, Burton and Graff? The answer is a negative one.
There is no evidence in the record of this cause that would
begin to support a finding that Happy Valley now stands
or has stood in a fiduciary capacity to Sweeney. In all
transactions and relations with the Corporation, Sweeney
has been and is an independent contractor under the 1957
Contract. At the outside, his status becomes one of a creditor of Happy Valley upon a land sale being made by the
latter. He comes no closer than that. It is manifest that
there is no fiduciary relationship between a corporation
and an independent contractor or a corporate creditor. As
stated in Briggs v. Spalding, 141 U. S. 133, 35 L. Ed. 662
(1890), as between contract creditors and a corporation,
vis-a-vis, "the relationship is that of contract and not of
trust". In Lane v. Peterson, 68 Utah 585, 251 Pac. 374
(1926), this Court had before it analogous facts to the
present case. Plaintiff, a contracting party with Defendant, sought an accounting as to certain property transactions carried out by Defendant, it being claimed that the
accounting was improper because of the Defendant's fraud.
Examining the burden of proof applicable in that case, this
Court said:
"The burden of proving the alleged fraud is
upon him who asserts it; moreover, the fraud must
be established by clear and convincing evidence."
The trial Court left no uncertainty in defining the relationship between Happy Valley and Sweeney:

"* * * The parties here in this lawsuit are
not joint adventurers. They are independent con-
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tractors; and I am required to determine the mean.
ing, and so interpret their contract.
"As I have stated, it is fundamental that this
Court will not re-make the contract for the parties"
(R. 346).
Furthermore, in the Court's Conclusions of Law, it is
provided in Paragraph 5:
"The relationship between Plaintiff and Happy .
Valley is a contractual one only, and is not a joint
venture and is not a fiduciary relationship" (R
233).
Sweeney, in his Motion to Amend the Conclusions of Law,
(R. 230-4) did not set out this Conclusion as error.
There being no fiduciary relationship in the case, the
doctrine and authorities upon which Sweeney depends have
no application. But the argument of Sweeney in Point
I ( B) of his Brief does not stop here. He seems to claim,
in addition, that a fiduciary obligation is due from the
Directors of Happy Valley to Sweeney (App. Br., pp. 32,
33, 34, 38) . The fallacy of that argument is that the di·
rectors are not parties to the accounting or to any aspect i
of the litigation. Furthermore, it is an established rul.e of i
law that there is no fiduciary relationship between d1rec· i
tors of a corporation and contract creditors of the corpora· !
tion. Patterson v. Stewart, 41 Minn. 84, 42 N. W. 926 ;
(1889). The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Webb V. Cash, '
I
35 Wyo. 398, 250 Pac. 1 ( 1926), said it this way:
I
1

1

"It is difficult to perceive upon what principle
a director of a corporation can be considered a
trustee of its creditors.
* * * he has no

1
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contractual relation with the latter; he represents a
distinct entity, the corporation and his relations to
its creditors is exactly the same as the agent of an
individual bears to creditors of such individuals;
and it is not pretended that in the latter case the
agent would be the trustee of the creditors of his
principal * * * "
The lower Court was correct in determining that the burden rested with Sweeney in proving that the sales and conveyances from Happy Valley to Bunker, Burton and Graff
were not in good faith so as to require a different accounting.

I

0 I

Lastly, Sweeney takes time out in Point I (B) to argue the weight of the expert testimony on market value
(App. Br., pp. 38-40). While such evidence has no direct
or indirect connection with the burden of proof issue and
is subject to a motion to strike, the following is a rebuttal
to such collateral matter. Contrary to the notions of
Sweeney's present counsel, it was clearly understood by the
parties in the trial Court that testimony on market value
was not received as independent evidence upon which the
accounting of Happy Valley was to be predicated. Its admissibility was of a more refined purpose, viz., as but one
of a number of factors which the trial Court would weigh
in determining whether the conveyances of Happy Valley
to its Directors were unfair, unreasonable or unconscionable so as to require a different accounting. Most of the
evaluation testimony was of an ex post facto nature. That
is to say, the appraisal judgments were formed after the
time, the legal effect of which was in question. The ap-
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praisal of William A. Myrick, made at the request of Hap.
PY Valley Directors and prior to the time when the con.
veyances were made, revealed a market value of $3,000.00
per lot. The trial judge found Myrick's testimony to be of
"practical" significance in the decision of what was fair
and wise at the time the sales and conveyances were made
to the Directors.
Although this Court will review the evidence in an
equity proceeding, it will not disturb the findings of the
trial Court unless they are clearly against the weight of
the evidence. Hart Bros. Music Co. v. Wood, 14 U. 2d 366,
384 P. 2d 591 (1963); Nunley v. Walker, 13 U. 2d 105,;
369 P. 2d 117 (1962).
POINT III.
T H E T R I A L COURT CONSIDERED AND
MADE EXPRESS FINDINGS ON SWEENEY'S
RIGHTS UNDER THE 1957 CONTRACT FOR
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT AND SALE OF
PROPERTY.
In Point I (C) of Sweeney's Brief, it is asserted that
the lower Court "refused to consider any testimony regard·
ing the terms of the Contract with respect to the develop·
ment of the properties and made no findings in reference
to the rights of Appellant in respect thereto" (App. Br.,
pp. 40-1). Conspicuously, however, Sweeney fails to make
reference in this phase of his Appeal to any testimony
offered by him during the ten-day trial on such issue. ,
Sweeney had an obligation to present testimony in the trial
I
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Court in support of his theory in this regard, rather than
proposing the same for the first time on appeal. Hamilton
v. Salt Lake County Sewage Improvement Dist., 15 U. 2d
216, 390 P. 2d 235 (1964).
Contrary to the self-sustained assertions in Sweeney's
Brief, the trial Court made the following express conclusions regarding his rights under the Contract:
"6. The Agreement of August 8, 1957 imposes
no obligation on Happy Valley to develop or sel'l the
premises on any time schedule and plaintiff has no
right of veto over Happy Valley's actions with regard thereto, save and except that plaintiff's prior
consent is required in the event Happy Valley seeks
to sell or develop said premises other than for residential purposes and a shopping center.
"7. Plaintiff is not entitled to any injunctive
relief as prayed."
The answer to Sweeney's claim in Point l(C) is complete by the statement that the lower Court did consider
and interpret Sweeney's rights under the Contract and incorporated the same within the Decree. Reduced to more
practical considerations, his claim is not that the trial
Court did not find on the issue, but that the finding was
not to his liking.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN REJECTING SWEENEY'S OFFER OF
PROOF AS TO SALES OF OTHER PROPERTY.
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(1)

At the time of the proffer, there was no
foundation as to the terms of the sales, the
relationship of the buyer and seller and other
factors necessary to determine comparability.

The opening sentence in Point I (D) of Sweeney's
Brief is classic:
"By the Court limiting the trial to a hearing of
an equitable accounting at the outset of the trial,
Appellant was very limited in the nature of the
testimony which he could adduce. * * *" App.
Br., p. 43).
Under the broad daylight of the transcript made in
this case, such a remark is ludicrous. Sweeney was given
leave to call witnesses and present testimony in whatever
order desired. Time and again, witnesses were called and
'
recalled out of turn by his counsel (R. 509, 537, 541, 578). I
Sweeney was even permitted to employ (what he admitted· i
ly called) "discovery" during the course of the trial (R. :
339-41).
The source for his statement above-quoted is not easily :
ascertained. It cannot stem from the trial Court's refusal i
to admit into evidence Sweeney's offer of proof (through
the testimony of Bunker) of certain sales (Nicolaides, ,
Prows, Inc., Johnson, Rowley, McKay, and Award Homes),
and from the further pro ffer (through the testimony of
Burton) of other sales (Gordon, Ferre, Manley, Gordon ;
and Bush, and Dyson), because the ruling made by the ·
lower Court thereon is consistent with the decisional Jaw in
1

3::S

this jurisdiction. There is no doubt from the record that
Sweeney made the proffer to evidence that such sales were
comparable to the subject properties in litigation and relevant in determining market value of the latter (R. 581-91).
Counsel for S\~.reeney began his off er of proof by saying:
"MR. HATCH: I have an offer of proof I
would like to make, your Honor, and, if we could
do this a little before trial in the morning, be a lot
easier.
"THE COURT: All right; are you going to
make an offer of proof; why don't you put your
witness on?
"MR. HATCH : This, your Honor, merely refers to the direct evidence of comparable sales which
the Court has not permitted me to bring in.
"THE COURT: Direct evidence of comparable sales?
"MR. HATCH: Yes;

* * *"

(R. 581-82).

Upon objection, such offers of proof were refused because there was no foundation at that point from expert
witnesses that the sales contained in the proffer were, in
fact, comparable to the properties in litigation. The law
is settled in this State that as a condition to the admissibility of sales of collateral property, it must be evidenced
by competent expert testimony that such sales, their location, terms and parties are, in fact, of reasonable comparison with the property before the Court. State Road Comm.
V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d 306, 352 P. 2d 693 (1960);
Stnte of Utah v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953).
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Absent such foundation, a sale is not admissible as direct
evidence of market value. State Road Comm. v. Woolley,
15 U. 2d 56, 390 P. 2d 860 (1964). Both Burton and
Bunker testified as laymen, not as experts. It is difficult
to perceive Sweeney's concern on the question, since the
sales within the proffer were ultimately received by the
Court as bearing on market value through subsequent expert witnesses of Sweeney and under his cross-examination
of Happy Valley witnesses (R. 479, 482, 484, 485-91, 556563, 629, 631-40, 865-880, 1237-1241).
Sweeney further argues that it was error not to receive evidence with respect to negotiations between Happy
Valley and the Federal Government over tax liabilities on
the properties sold by Happy Valley to the Directors. It is
said that the lower Court foreclosed cross-examination of
C. Taylor Burton as to appraisals (Ex. 8D-13D) obtained
by the Directors and "used" in connection with "difficulties with the Federal Government", in the re-evaluation of
the lots under litigation for tax purposes (App. Br., p. 456). While Appellant makes no reference to that portion of
the Record wherein the cross-examination and error is said
to have taken place, it is assumed, for purposes of this rebuttal, that such is found at R. 1170. Sweeney's argument
on this score is much more sophisticated than a fair read·
ing of the Record allows. There is no evidence, as his con·
tention would infer, that Happy Valley obtained the con·
cerned appraisals for tax negotiation purposes. The testi·
mony is all to the contrary. Mr. Burton at R. 371, indi·
cated that such appraisals were merely "referred to" in

.
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negotiation with federal tax personnel. But the cross-examination of Burton at R. 1170, of which Sweeney now
complains, did not concern appraisal data at all. It was
directed at the evaluation of 24 subdivision lots for the
compromise of a tax liability:
By Mr. Hatch for Sweeney:
"Now, following the transfer of twenty-four
lots in Subdivision 1 from the corporation to you
and to the two directors of the corporation, did not
the Federal Government for tax purposes, require
that you re-evaluate those at a different figure?"
(R. 1170).
'I1here was clearly no foundation before the Court to suggest that such a question was germane to the issues of market value or good faith, and until such foundation was presented, the possible compromise of subsequent tax liabilities was properly excluded as irrelevant. 2 Jones on Evidence, 726, Sec. 390 (5th Ed., 1958).
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS
INTERPRETATION THAT THE 1957 CONTRACT CALLED FOR AN ACCOUNTING
BASED ON "GROSS PROCEEDS OF SALES."
Point II of Sweeney's Brief argues that the trial Court
failed to interpret properly the 1957 Contract between the
parties in that it did not accept Sweeney's theory as to
the basis for the accounting. Capsulized, that theory was
two-fold: (1) that he is entitled to an accounting predi-
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cated upon the "fair market value of the property, at the
time of the conveyance, as residential lots" and (2) thal
any sale made is subject to his retrospective determinatior.
of market value. Although Sweeney was willing to accepl
an accounting on the Estates, Inc., transaction on the basis
of gross proceeds rather than market value because gross
proceeds yielded a larger return in that instance, his o\}
jections to Happy Valley's accounting and request for declaratory and injunctive relief were fastened, in the main,
to these two proposals.
The 1957 Contract makes it crystal clear that Sweeney
is wrong on both arguments. Paragraph 6 of the Contract
expressly provides that the accounting is to be based upon
gross proceeds of sales and not fair market value:
"The gross proceeds of sales of all of such prop·
erties sold for residential lots shall be divided intu
two portions, one equal to seventy-five percent,
(75%) and the other equal to twenty-five percent"•
(R. 80).
Whatever the gross proceeds of a particular sale con·
summaited by Happy Valley is, Sweeney is entitled to an
accounting of those proceeds and a tender of money from :
Happy Valley of 7.95 percent thereof. So far as fair mar·.
ket value of the property sold may be related to the gross
proceeds received from the sale, all that the Contract fairly
implies and imports is that Happy Valley transact the sales
fairly, reasonably and in good faith. To that end, however,
Happy Valley is free to exercise its own business judgment
or
- and such may be more or less than what Sweeney
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3.nyone

might later peg as market value. If Happy Valley
consummates a sale for an amount in excess of a property's
fair market value, Sweeney is entitled to 7.95 percent of
the gross proceeds, nothing less. By the same mark, if a
sale is made by Happy Valley and later determined to be
less than fair market value, Sweeney is entitled to the
same percentage of the gross proceeds of such sale, nothing
more. The bitter goes with the sweet. To construe the
1957 Contract as requiring a division between the parties
on a basis other than gross proceeds would be to rewrite
and reform the Agreement, a theory which not even
Sweeney, to this time, has asserted.
As to the second part of his argument, the Contract
does not grant to him a right to concur in the terms or
nature of sales made by Happy Valley. No clause entitles
him to veto a transaction or to accept it on his conditions.
Nor does the Contract in any degree afford him the luxury
of a "second guess" as to whether a sale made by Happy
\Talley was the right thing to do under the circumstances.
The lower Court was of this conclusion (R. 218).
The trademark of the gross proceeds test under the
Contract is that sum received by the Corporation in the
sale consummated and not the value of what it conveyed.
To insure that the gross proceeds received by Happy Valley
were fair and in good faith, the Court took evidence concerning four categories of transactions, the accountings as
to which Sweeney objected. Each is discussed in chronological order.
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Lot sales to Directors. As set forth in the Statemenl
of Facts, Happy Valley sold and conveyed numerous lots w
its Directors, Burton, Bunker and Graff, at $3,000.00 per
lot. Sweeney admitted at one point of the trial that hao
the sales been consummated with third parties, he wou!O
have been bound thereby and entitled to 7.95 percent of the
gross proceeds (R. 345). That the sales were, in fact, made
to the Directors of Happy Valley does not warrant a dif.
ferent result since there is no fiduciary relationship b~
tween Happy Valley and Sweeney.
Why did Happy Valley sell the lots to the Directors!
The reasons were that the initial demands for cash on Hap·
py Valley were far greater than anticipated, having been
accelerated by requests from Willow Creek Country CM
for fee title conveyance rather than on extended real estati
contract as originally planned (R. 360, 365, 522, 532-o,
1131-3, 1145). The lot sales program had not maiterializeu
and there was no ready market for them at a price Jess
than $3,000.00 (R. 366-70, 372-86, 514-28, 599, 1163-4). ·
Faced with an almost certainty that the project would fail
if funds were not provided, the Directors bought .the Jo~ ·
themselves at a price fair and reasonable at the time.
There is a plethora of evidence that the lot price of
$3,000.00 was established not arbitrarily or collusively, but
only after consideration of the foregoing factors and the •
3
opinions of disinterested parties, i. e., William Myrick,
banker; appraisers, Stahle, Nelson and Ashton; and real·
tors and builders, Manford Shaw and Holmes (R. 1173-Si,
Ex. 8D-13D). Sweeney's answer to this testimony came in
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the form of retrospective appraisals of three individuals,
Tucker, Teerlink and Kiepe. The testimony of each had
the air of advocacy and, as the trial Court put it in its Memorandum Decision, gave the impression:
"That the witnesses had been given more than
necessary instruction by Plaintiff himself in the
hope that they would reproduce his views. I think
I detected frustration in these witnesses attempting
to develop for the Court the blueprint which Plaintiff himself had insisted upon, rather than giving
a more spontaneous expression of comparative values which finally would have been more helpful to
me. * * *" (R. 208).
Mr. Kiepe, who had appraised the properties in 1959
prior to retainment by Sweeney, initially evaluated the land
at substantially less than $3,000.00 per lot. His 1962 and
1963 appraisals of the same properties as of the 1959 date
reflected V1alues five times the greater (Ex. lP, 38P, 22P).
Of further interest was the fact that the Second Party, including Sweeney, in May, 1960, equated $275,000.00 to the
value of 75 lots in the subdivision, or $3,333.00 per lot (R.
1095, Ex. 52D). Although Happy Valley offered to sell
lots to Second Party at $3,000.00 (R. 1058, Ex. 42P),
neither Second Party nor Sweeney, individually, accepted
the offer.
The trial Court found from these and other facts that
the sales from Happy Valley to its Directors were not unfair, unreasonable, shocking, unconscionable or fraudulent
(Findings 17-20, R. 215-16). It is the settled law of the
case that those Findings will not be overturned by this
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Court unless the same are found to be clearly in error.
Hart Bros. Music Co. v. Wood, 14 U. 2d 366, 384 P. 2d 59!
(1963); Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 14 U. 2d 30
376 P. 2d 940 (1962); In re Drainage Area of Bear River,
12 U. 2d 1, 361 P. 2d 407 (1961).
I

Thirty-one acre sale to Second Party interests. Seem.
ingly, Sweeney claims that Happy Valley was not entitleil
to dispose of property covered by the 1957 Contract as undeveloped acreage. The position is fallacious. The Contract
provides and the lower Court found that property could be
sold "for residential lots" and not merely "as residential
lots". The Contract does not condition a sale upon the ex·
istence of subdivided lots, nor would it assume that an ac·
counting thereon would be, as contended by Sweeney, pred·
icated upon a de facto subdivision.
The hard facts of the thirty-one acre sale are that the
buyers or grantees were all members of and comprised •
I
50.9 percent of the Second Party under the 1957 Contract.
Happy Valley, seller, then owned an additional 17.3 percent
of the Second Party interest. Accordingly, the transaction
was entered into and approved by 68.2 percent of Second
Party. Nowhere does the 1957 Contract give Sweeney, by
his minority interest, a veto power to thereby frustrate
the intent of the majority of Second Party.
Under the accounting, Sweeney was entitled to his
·
7.95 percent of the computed gross proceeds, havmg
a rea·
sonable cash value of $42,908.00. Such was the determina·
tion of the trial Comli; (R. 213).

i
...._
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Estates, Inc., transaction. The undisputed testimony
and the stipulation of the parties shows that the costs of
the off-site improvements which Estates, Inc., (through its
principal officer, Manford A. Shaw) constructed for Happy Valley properties in consideration of the 2% acre conveyance, were $13,762.85. That sum constituted the gross
proceeds received by Happy Valley from the transaction.
It is at this stage that the consistency and "good faith" of
Sweeney is put to the rack. Under the testimony of
Sweeney's own witnesses, the value of the 2% acres was
$10,000.00. It turns out that in this instance, adherence to
the "market value" test ($10,000.00) yields a lesser return
to Sweeney than does the "gross proceeds" standard ($13,742.85). Finding such to be the case, Sweeney acknowledged before the trial Court that he would accordingly accept an accounting on the Estates, Inc., transaction based
on gross proceeds :
"For the Estates, Inc., tract at the north end
of Sub. 4, the defendant received improvements
worth (according to Manford Shaw's stipulated
testimony) $13,742.85. We would accept this as
gross proceeds" (Para. 16, Sweeney's Tr. Br., p.
10).
On appeal, Sweeney has taken a slig1htly different
stand than that in the lower Court (App. Br., p. 54). Happy Valley, however, has tendered its accounting on the
premise that yields the larger return to Sweeney, gross
proceeds.

Water Ccnservancy and Jessup transactions. Happy
Valley, at an early stage in development, conveyed a well
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site to the Salt Lake Water Conservancy District and later
an irregular parcel to Jessup. As to the former, the con.
veyance was made in furtherance of Happy Valley's obliga.
tion to furnish water for the Willow Creek Country Club,
the chief negotiator for the Club being Mr. Sweeney. The
property underlying the well site was not considered part
of the residential development by the parties under the
1957 Contract (R. 1108-9, Ex. 22P). The conveyance of the
small triangular parcel to Mr. Jessup was realized for the
purpose of establishing a stable boundary and property description for the greater Happy Valley holdings.
I

The Corporation did not receive any proceeds or assets
for either the well-site transaction or the Jessup convey·
ance. The trial Court found, upon ample evidence, that said
conveyances were made by Happy Valley in good faith and
for the purpose of stabilizing the properties held for resi·
dential purposes (Findings 10, 11, R. 214). Happy Valley
has tendered no moneys to Sweeney representative of these
transactions. The reason is elementary: 7.95 percent of
nothing is nothing.
Of course, Sweeney claims his "fair" share of these
no-proceeds transactions. While demand for 7.95 percent
of the fair market value of the two parcels was vigorous
in the trial Court, his Brief on appeal barely touches the
matter (App. Br., p. 54). The inconsistency of his ap·
proach to these tracts is met by the incongruity of his theor·
ies and arguments on the case in its entirety.
Sweeney's arguments on the Contract can be won not
The lower
.
by interpretation, but only by re f orma t ion.
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Court ref used to rewrite the Contract and we respectfully
submit that this Court should not do otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Counsel for Sweeney, in his Summary, lament of the
"extreme difficult circumstances under which Appellant
had to present his evidence". It is said that the trial in the
•
lower Court was frequently interrupted for "so-called voir
dire examination" so as to bring it within the remarks of
Henroid, C. J., in Bd. of Ed. of Salt Lake City v. Bothwell
and Swaner Co., 16 U. 2d 341, 400 P. 2d 568 (1965). Such
an attack is unwise. True enough, counsel for both parties
had their hand at voir dire examination from time to time
during the trial and Sweeney's counsel even engaged in
some discovery. But the suit was in equity for an accounting and injunctive relief, tried without a jury and in an
informal atmosphere. Both parties were given substantial
latitude in the mode of presenting their evidence.
For that matter, Happy Valley has, itself, shouldered
a few unusual burdens in this suit. One is that since the
original Complaint was filed by Sweeney, three separate
counsel have, at one stage or another, appeared in his behalf to urge new and sometimes diverse claims. That is not
to critique the conduct of such counsel in any way, for all
I have been able lawyers. It is, nevertheless, a fact that
Happy Valley has been put to the defense of its accounting
and the case in a different manner by each appearance.
Sweeney's Brief has, in substantial respects, been presented
to this Court on Appeal as though the matter was on a de
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novo hearing. Not once is reference made to specific erron
claimed of the lower Court in the Findings, Conclusion1
and Decree as entered. The Appeal is substantively defi.
cient in that regard.
Sweeney is not entitled to a jury trial on the account.
ing or other equity issues. The accounting, as determineii
by the trial Court, was proper and the Findings and Conclusions made with respect to the 1957 Contract should be,
by this Court, in all respects affirmed and the case r~
mitted accordingly.
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